Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications: Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing by Kaserman, David L. & Mayo, John W.
Cross-Subsidies in
Telecommunications:




A decade ago, Alfred Kahn challenged regulators to adopt more efficient
telephone pricing policies. They have yet to respond and instead have
maintained a system of inefficient cross-subsidies. While some argue that the
current system promotes universal telephone service, a careful examination
reveals that the cross-subsidies do not further that goal. Professors Kaserman
and Mayo argue that regulators maintain the current system because they
believe that its pattern of cross-subsidization benefits a politically influential
class-local residential customers. Kaserman and Mayo contend, however, that
the regulators are wrong. the benefits from the current cross-subsidies are so
diffused that abolishing them will not ultimately affect individual customers.
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Introduction
In 1984, the same year as the AT&T divestiture, Alfred Kahn challenged
regulators to adopt more efficient pricing policies in the telecommunications
industry, thereby moving public policy down "the road to more intelligent
telephone pricing."1 A full decade later regulators have yet to respond
substantially. The traditional inefficient pricing structure, containing pervasive
cross-subsidization among customers, remains largely intact. In our view,
regulators' reluctance to adopt more efficient pricing policies that reduce or
eliminate these cross-subsidies stems from a perception that such policies would
seriously antagonize important political constituencies. Their reluctance is not
due to an inability to comprehend or a failure to appreciate the economic
benefits such policies offer. To succeed, future efforts to persuade regulators
to adopt more efficient policies must demonstrate that the political costs of
more intelligent telephone pricing are not as great as regulators currently
perceive them to be.
Kahn's basic proposal involves changing the existing structure of telephone
rates to more closely reflect the marginal costs of providing the various services
1. Alfred E. Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, I YALE J. ON REG. 139 (1984).
The policy recommendations made in Kahn's paper were not new. Kahn and others had been preaching
the virtues of efficient pricing for years.
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involved-namely customer access, long-distance usage, and local usage.'
Kahn argues that efficient pricing requires a two-part tariff.3 Such a tariff
consists of a fixed charge to cover the non-traffic-sensitive costs of access and
a variable charge to cover the traffic-sensitive costs of network usage. Each
component of the tariff would reflect the marginal cost of the respective service.
Adopting this sort of pricing structure would yield substantial benefits in the
formh of increased economic efficiency and more equitable rates. In addition,
more efficient pricing would help cultivate the increasing competition now
emerging in telecommunications markets.
The increasing intensity of competitive market forces in this industry will
eventually necessitate the recommended pricing structure regardless of regula-
tory action or inaction because competition inevitably drives prices to marginal
costs.4 Until this occurs, however, society continues to bear the costs imposed
by existing inefficient pricing policies. Consequently, Kahn argues that in the
interim regulators should actively pursue more efficient, cost-based rates to reap
the benefits such a policy offers. Economists have estimated that the efficiency
losses caused by existing policies that keep long-distance rates above costs
amount to $1.5 to $10 billion annually.5 Moreover, these estimates-are probably
too low because they do not consider the incalculable losses resulting from the
distortion of dynamic market incentives to create and adopt technological
advances that make more efficient use of the long-distance network.'
Despite the compelling logic of Kahn's recommendations and the
magnitude of the benefits at stake, the progress achieved toward efficient
pricing has been disappointingly small to date. While there has been some
perceptible movement down the road Kahn mapped so clearly a decade ago,
the pace of change has been excruciatingly slow. Regulators have largely
refused to implement the proposed policies.7
2. Id. at 140.
3. Id. at 141.
4. Id. at 151.
5. See, e.g., James M. Griffin, The Wefare Implications of Externalities and Price Elasticities for Tele-
communications Pricing, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 59, 65 (1982); John T. Wenders & Bruce L. Egan, The
Implications of Economic Efficiency for US Telecommunications Policy, 10 TELEPHONE POL'Y 33 (1986).
6. Alfred Kahn and William Shew noted this several years ago:
Whatever the historic justification for the system of pricing still in effect today, it has long
since disappeared. its social cost today is to be reckoned not merely in terms of a multi-billion
dollar annual static welfare loss, but, perhaps even more important, in the ways in which it
has discouraged the exploitation of one of our most dynamic, versatile technologies.
Alfred E. Kahn & William B. Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 YALE
J. ON REG. 191, 255-56 (1987).
7. The slow movement toward more efficient pricing policies has been paralleled by the pace of
deregulation. Despite the 1984 divestiture, both long-distance and local telecommunications services remain
largely regulated today. At the state level, public utility commissions regulate (to varying degrees) local
rates, intrastate carrier access charges, and intrastate toll rates. At the federal level, the Federal
Communications Commission regulates interstate carrier access charges, the interstate portion of end-user
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Why have regulators been so hesitant to embrace the clear advantages of
more efficient pricing policies? The answer to this question lies in the cross-
subsidization mechanisms that characterize the current pricing structure. Regula-
tors favor the existing pricing structure because they believe their political
support is crucially dependent upon maintaining the subsidy flow it creates.
This belief, which we feel is largely erroneous or at least exaggerated, is the
principal roadblock to more intelligent telephone pricing.8
The existing system of cross-subsidies exhibits several undesirable proper-
ties. In this Article, we argue that regulators' adherence to a policy favoring
such subsidies stems primarily from the low local telephone rates that result
from them and the political support they provide rather than the more frequently
heard argument that these subsidies support the social goal of universal service.
It is our contention that, in fact, both beliefs are mistaken. Cross-subsidies do
not promote universal service, and the political costs of removing them are not
as great as some parties have led regulators to believe. Consequently, efforts
to encourage regulators to abolish cross-subsidies and adopt more efficient
pricing policies must do more than merely reemphasize the desirable efficiency
properties of such actions; they must also correct the regulators' misperception
that the political ramifications of more intelligent telephone pricing would be
disastrous to their careers.
Part I of this Article describes the efficient pricing structure advocated by
Kahn and the cost structure of the telecommunications industry and contrasts
these with the pricing policies regulators currently employ. Part II explains the
existing system of cross-subsidies that results from these pricing policies. Part
III describes the patently undesirable properties of this system of cross-
subsidies. Finally, Part IV argues that regulators' support for the inefficient
pricing policies stems from misperceptions about the political support these
policies generate and suggests that future arguments for reform address
regulators' political concerns.
I. Costs Versus Prices Under the Current System
One cannot understand the inefficiency of the current pricing system
without first examining the structure of costs, the services provided, and the
traditional pricing policies employed in the telecommunications industry. In this
access charges, and the interstate toll rates of AT&T. This lethargic pace of deregulation has led one
commentator to write that "lulndoubtedly, the greatest surprise in telephone industry deregulation has been
the absence of deregulation, for the industry continues to be almost as highly regulated today as twenty years
ago." Robert W. Crandall, Surprises from Telephone Deregulation and the Divestiture, 78 AM. ECoN. REV.
323, 323-27 (1988); see also David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long Distance Telecommunications
Policy: Rationality on Hold, 122 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 18 (1988).
8. Attempts to preserve cross-subsidies have also slowed the pace of deregulation in other industries.
Theodore E. Keeler, Theories of Regulation and the Deregulation Movement, 44 PUB. CHOICE 103 (1984).
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part, we describe these basic features of the industry and explain how traditional
pricing policies used to set telephone rates conflict with efficient pricing
principles.9
A. Efficiency in Pricing
An economically efficient allocation of resources exists if, under a given
set of preferences and income distribution, it is impossible to find an alternative
allocation that will make one or more individuals better off without making
some other individuals worse off.' Consequently, if there is an inefficient
allocation of resources, it is possible to improve the lot of some without
injuring others. An efficient pricing system usually exists when the price of a
good or service is equal to the marginal cost of producing it.
The general efficiency of marginal cost pricing stems from the important
role that prices play in directing the consumption and production decisions of
individuals and firms in a market economy. The price consumers are willing
to pay for a unit of good X indicates the marginal value (or opportunity cost)
of other goods they give up to obtain a unit of X. The price of the last unit of
X purchased in the market indicates society's marginal willingness to pay for
that unit. Similarly, the marginal cost of a unit of X is the marginal value of
the goods society forgoes producing to manufacture the marginal unit of X.
When price is equal to marginal cost, society's marginal willingness to pay for
the last unit of X is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of producing that
unit. This equality is necessary to maximize the total value to society from
consumption and production of a good.
B. The Cost Structure of the Telecommunications Industry
The costs of providing telecommunications services fall into two broad
categories-fixed costs that do not vary with the volume of calling and variable
costs that do vary with volume. What distinguishes telecommunications from
most other industries is the relative magnitude of fixed costs. For local ex-
9. The analysis that follows sums up much that one can find in greater detail elsewhere. See, e.g.,
GERALD BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (1981); LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DEMAND: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE (1980); JOHN T. WENDERS, THE ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
THEORY AND POLICY (1987); Griffin, supra note 5; Kahn, supra note 1; Bridger M. Mitchell, Optimal
Pricing of Local Telephone Service, 68 AM. ECoN. REV. 517 (1978).
10. See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 510-11 (1st ed. 1983).
I1. Kahn, supra note I, at 140. The two principal exceptions to the efficiency of marginal cost pricing
involve public goods and externalities. See BROWNING & BROWNING, supra note 10, at 657-75. For a
specific discussion of such exceptions in the telecommunications industry, see WENDERS, supra note 9, at
22-33.
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change companies, such costs account for a large percentage of the typical
firm's total costs.12
Fixed costs result primarily from providing customer access to both the
local and long-distance networks. These costs represent the assets comprising
the local exchange that connect the customer's telephone to the local end office,
such as wires, poles, and switching equipment. These assets provide the cus-
tomer the opportunity to place and receive telephone calls-they provide a dial
tone.
Variable costs vary directly with the volume of traffic on the network.
These costs include, inter alia, expenditures to operate switches and carry
signals as well as a small portion of billing and collection expenses. Moreover,
a share of the capacity costs of the system also varies with usage, especially
at periods of peak demand, because the networks must provide a certain level
of reliability.
Any efficient telephone pricing system must take into account two
important and incontrovertible facts about fixed network costs. First, fixed costs,
by definition, bear no relationship to the volume of usage; they would remain
constant even if no one ever placed a call. Consequently, the fundamental
principle of efficient pricing--cost causation-requires that the per-unit price
of telephone usage be independent of fixed costs. It is inefficient to assign any
fixed costs whatsoever to the per-minute price of telephone usage. Doing so
raises the price of usage above marginal cost, thereby pushing usage below the
efficient level.
Second, the assets that make up the bulk of the fixed costs must be in
place to complete either local or long-distance telephone calls. Although the
local exchange companies have owned these assets since divestiture, fixed costs
are actually common costs that cannot be causally attributed to the usage of
either type of service. 13 Any attempt to do so will result in economically
inefficient prices, regardless of the apparent logic or fairness of the allocation
methodology.
These two facts require that an efficient pricing system recover fixed costs
through a fixed end-user access charge for providing customer access to the
network. This charge should cover the cost of constructing and maintaining the
fixed assets of the local network. Such a charge is consistent with the principle
of cost causation because it is the customer's decision to subscribe to telephone
service rather than the decision to use that service that necessitates the construc-
tion and maintenance of fixed assets.
12. See Kahn, infra note I, at 141. Attempts by various parties to convince state regulatory commissions
that a substantial portion of these fixed costs do vary with usage are largely.specious. See supra notes 40-50
and accompanying text.
13. For a definition of common costs, see I ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 77-83 (1970).
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. The variable costs of both local and long-distance service consist of the
costs of transmitting and switching calls over the respective networks. These
costs may be relatively small on a per-unit basis, particularly for local service.
They are not zero, however, especially for usage at peak periods. An efficient
pricing system should recover these costs through usage-based prices that reflect
the marginal costs of providing the service if the incremental costs of metering
usage are less than the efficiency gains generated by such prices. 4 If marginal
cost is sufficiently close to zero or if the incremental costs of metering local
usage are sufficiently large, a usage-based local rate structure (commonly
known as local measured service) is inefficient. The currently predominant
practice of charging a flat monthly rate for local service would then be entirely
appropriate.
In practice, however, flat monthly rates for local service are unlikely to
be efficient. Recent technological advances, primarily the installation of stored
program control in electronic central offices, have made it possible for local
exchanges to meter usage at greatly reduced costs.'5 Continuing to price
marginal consumption of local service at zero by using a flat monthly rate
creates substantial efficiency losses easily amounting to millions of dollars. 6
The price of local service should therefore reflect the variable costs of using
the local network to place calls on a minutes-of-use basis.' 7 The cost of using
the long-distance network is already priced on that basis, though the prices
currently charged exceed marginal cost by at least a wide margin 8 due to the
allocation of fixed costs to this service.
Efficient (and intelligent) telephone pricing therefore requires a two-part
tariff. A fixed monthly charge, independent of usage, should recover the fixed
costs of providing customer access to the network. A usage-based charge for
both local and long-distance services equal to the marginal costs of the respec-
tive services would recover usage sensitive costs. 9 Under this system, it
14. If the costs of metering, a requirement for usage sensitive pricing, are high relative to the unmetered
cost of providing local telephone usage, then pricing such usage on a flat-rate basis can be economically
efficient. See John T. Wenders, Two Views of Applied Welfare Analysis: The Case of Local Telephone Ser-
vice Pricing, 57 S. ECON. J. 340, 346 (1990); see also BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG,
TELECOMMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 255 (1991) (citing study by Park and Mitchell);
James Griffen & Thomas Mayor, The Welfare Gain from Efficient Pricing of Local Telephone Service, 30
J.L. & ECON. 455, 465-88 (1987): Kahn & Shew, supra note 6, at 235-39.
15. With stored program control, all messages (including local) are routed through computers that
contain software capable of recording both call duration and time of day. As a result, the costs of metering
local usage have been reduced significantly by adoption of this new technology.
16. See Carlos Martins-Filho & John W. Mayo, Demand and Pricing of Telephone Services: Evidence
and Welfare Implications, 24 RAND J. ECON. 439, 451 (1993).
17. For empirical evidence on the welfare gains from usage-based pricing, see Griffen & Mayor, supra
note 14, at 480; MITCHELL & VOGELSANG, supra note 14, at 255 (citing study by Park and Mitchell).
18. Kahn, supra note 1, at 141-42.
i9. Id. at 141. The two-part tariff (or nonlinear pricing in general) is efficient in situations where (a)
both fixed costs and variable costs are present, and (b) marginal costs are below average costs. See Robert
D. Willig, Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules, 9 BELL J. ECON. 56 (1978) (discussing the two-part
tariff).
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would be unnecessary to allocate fixed costs to either long-distance or local
usage. All customers would directly pay the fixed costs caused by their decision
to subscribe to telephone service through the fixed component of the two-part
tariff. Adopting such a pricing structure would be a significant movement along
the policy path Kahn so highly recommended.
C. Traditional Pricing Policies: Smoke and Mirrors
When economists first encounter pricing policies in the telecommunications
industry, they get the uncomfortable feeling of having passed through the
looking glass. They encounter foreign concepts with no apparent foundation
in economic theory. Moreover, widespread reliance on these concepts makes
it difficult to assess the merits of various regulatory decisions. Specifically, four
erroneous concepts characterize regulatory rate-setting practices: (1) pricing on
the basis of fully-distributed costs; (2) value-of-service pricing; (3) flat-rate
pricing for local service; and (4) rate averaging. 0
1. Fully-Distributed Cost Pricing
Regulators have traditionally based telephone prices on fully distributed
costs. 2' This practice involves assigning the costs of the regulated firm to
various services on the basis of some criterion other than the marginal costs
of providing those services. Use of this practice has involved, inter alia,
allocation of the large common costs of providing customer access to long-
distance usage. Historically, such allocations occurred through the separations
and settlements process under which network costs were first separated and
assigned to the local and long-distance services.22 The resulting revenues were
then settled or divided between the various Bell Operating Companies and
independent local telephone companies.23
Under this system, the rate structure depends entirely upon the criteria used
to allocate costs. These criteria have traditionally borne no relation to marginal
costs. Before the AT&T divestiture, regulators allocated an increasing share of
the fixed costs of the network to the usage-sensitive price of long-distance
20. As we shall see, all of the concepts discussed in this section are selectively applied in pricing tele-
communications services. Apparently, none of the pricing concepts discussed here is viewed as a general
principle that should apply to all pricing decisions.
21. Our discussion of this pricing approach is necessarily brief. For more complete exposure, see
William J. Baumol et al., How Arbitrary Is "Arbitrary?"--or, Toward the Deserved Demise of Full Cost
Allocation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 3, 1987, at 16; Ronald R. Braeutigam, An Analysis of Fully Distributed
Cost Pricing in Regulated Industries, II BELL J. EcON. (190); George Sweeney, Welfare Implications of
Fully Distributed Cost Pricing Applied to Partially Regulated Firms, 13 BELL J. ECON. 525 (1982).
22. For long-distance services, costs were separated and assigned to the intrastate and interstate
jurisdictions as well.
23. See WENDERS, supra note 9, at 3.
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service.' This process has continued since the divestiture through the carrier
access charge system implemented in 1984. Under this system, local exchange
carriers recover a significant portion of their fixed costs from carrier access
charges long-distance firms pay. The long-distance company must pay a fee
to the local exchange company for every minute of usage on both the
originating and terminating ends of the call. These access charges currently
account for roughly fifty percent of the costs of providing long-distance
service.2"
Despite considerable variation among different states and a general decline
in recent years, all of these access charges exceed local exchange companies'
marginal costs of providing access because regulators invariably allocate a large
portion of fixed costs to long-distance usage.26 Regulators usually justify this
allocation by observing that long-distance customers benefit from the presence
of the local network and consequently should bear some of the costs associated
with it. This argument rests on the erroneous assumption that there exists a
group of long-distance consumers who would somehow escape paying for the
fixed costs of the local network if long-distance services were priced at
marginal cost.
Under an efficient pricing system, all customers, including those who use
only long-distance services, would pay a fixed end-user access charge to cover
the costs of fixed assets. Whether these assets benefit customers who place or
receive a long-distance call is immaterial. The cost of long-distance usage
should be the only factor that governs the decision to use the long-distance
network. By definition, these usage costs do not include any fixed costs. Thus,
fully-distributed cost pricing is economically indefensible. It results in long-
distance prices that exceed marginal costs and thereby suppresses long-distance
use below the efficient level.27
2.. Value-of-Service Pricing
Value-of-service pricing attempts to charge customers who value a
particular telephone service more highly than other customers a higher price
for that service, even if the costs of providing the service are the same for all
24. See Peter Temin, Cross Subsidies in the Telephone Network after Divestiture, 2 J. REG. ECON. 349
(1990) (providing a more complete accounting of the evolution of cost allocations under this system).
25. See David L. Kaserman et al., Open Entry and Local Telephone Rates: The Economics of
IntraLATA Toll Competition 6 (Sept. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). These charges
currently average approximately 12€ per minute. Id.
26. David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long Distance Telecommunications: Expectations and
Realizations in the Post-Divestiture Period, in INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES (Michael A.
Crew ed., forthcoming Oct. 1994).
27. The artificially high prices of long-distance services that result from this system have other
potentially serious efficiency consequences in the long run: they encourage uneconomic bypass of the public
switched network and retard technological advances in the utilization of long-distance services.
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customers. In practice, regulators use value-of-service pricing to justify charging
business customers higher rates for local service than residential customers.28
Value-of-service pricing is a form of price discrimination because the
resulting rates differ from marginal costs by unequal percentages. While some
types of price discrimination, such as Ramsey pricing,29 are efficient under
certain conditions, there is no reason to believe that value-of-service pricing
produces efficient telephone rates. More importantly, value-of-service pricing
fails to satisfy the principle of cost causation because the prices charged under
this system do not equal marginal costs. A single-line business customer using
local service, for example, may not impose greater costs on the network than
a typical residential customer, but the business customer may pay up to four
times as much for local service as residential customers.3 °
One fallacy implicit in value-of-service pricing is that businesses will not
ultimately recover at least a portion of these increased prices from their
customers. In reality, higher telephone rates will increase the costs of doing
business and raise the market-clearing prices businesses charge their customers.
Regulators cannot, however, know the extent to which these customers will bear
the costs of higher telephone prices a priori because this will depend upon
factors such as the share of a product's costs for which telephone service inputs
account and the elasticity of demand for different products. Consequently, the
burden of the tax will fall arbitrarily on different consumer groups, creating
further economic inefficiencies.
A second fallacy involved in value-of-service pricing is that equity
considerations require regulators to consider explicitly the value of a service
to different customer groups. This notion conflicts with the principle of cost-
causation, and thus with efficient pricing principles as well, because there is
no relation between the value an individual customer places on a service and
the cost of producing it. Indeed, if it were true as a general proposition that
prices should reflect consumer valuations rather than producer costs, it would
be necessary to proscribe competitive markets because competition drives prices
to marginal costs regardless of the value non-marginal customers receive from
28. For a recent discussion of pricing and cross-subsidization between business and residential telephone
customers, see Karen Palmer, A Test for Cross Subsidies in Local Telephone Rates: Do Business Customers
Subsidize Residential Customers?, 23 RAND J. ECON. 415 (1992).
29. Ramsey pricing involves pricing a multiproduct regulated firm's services at prices that depart from
marginal costs in inverse relation to the elasticities of demand for those services. See F.P. Ramsey, A
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927); see also William J. Baumol & David F.
Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970). Ramsey prices
are only efficient in a limited second-best sense-that is, relative to a set of non-discriminatory uniform
prices. Once we allow for the possibility of nonlinear pricing (a two-part tariff), Ramsey prices are no longer
efficient. See Willig, supra note 19, at 61.
30. NATIONAL ASs'N OF REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, BELL OPERATING COMPANIES EXCHANGE
SERVICE TELEPHONE RATES (1991) (comparing business and residential rates).
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their purchases.3' We suspect that even most value-of-service pricing
advocates would not favor elimination of competitive markets as a general
policy prescription (although we also suspect that some might).
3. Flat-Rate Pricing of Local Service
For many years, most local telephone companies have charged customers
a fixed, monthly rate independent of usage.32 This practice creates a tying
arrangement between customer access and local usage by pricing the two
services as a bundle.33 Two distinct problems characterize this system: one
involves the rate structure and the other the rate level. First, the rate structure
effectively prices usage at zero. Thus, consumers receive false signals about
the social costs of their usage. These erroneous signals, in turn, encourage
socially excessive usage of the local network, especially at peak periods. A
second problem is that regulators have typically set local flat rates at levels that
fail to cover the costs of the access/local usage bundle. As a result, local
telephone exchanges have required a subsidy from long-distance markets to
cover the costs of constructing, maintaining, and operating the local networks.
Regulators have tried to justify this scheme by arguing that revenues can
only be obtained from two basic categories of telephone services-local and
long-distance. Under this view, consumers value customer access only for the
calls it enables them to make rather than as a separate service. Therefore,
regulators view it as inappropriate to charge a separate, fixed fee for access,
as efficient pricing requires. As a result, regulators must load access costs onto
the only remaining revenue sources-the prices of local and long-distance
services.
This reasoning exhibits two flaws. First, customer access provides the
opportunity to both place and receive calls. Consequently, customers may
demand access even if they place no calls. Second, efficient pricing principles
require telephone companies to recover costs in the manner they incur them,
whether or not they can identify such costs with a separate product or service.
31. At the aggregate level, consumer valuations influence the overall demand for a product. Demand,
in turn, affects price by influencing the total amount produced and thus the marginal costs of production.
Prices in competitive markets, however, do not generally reflect differences in valuations between individual
customers.
32. Figures reported in NAT'L ASSOCIATION OF REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, supra note 30, at 12-15,
indicate that approximately 75% of residential customers and 50% of business customers in the United States
piy a flat rate for local service.
33. A tying arrangement exists when the seller of one product (here, access) requires that its customers
also purchase another product (local service) from it, and the two products are priced jointly as a bundle.
See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 381 (1985).
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It is therefore possible to reach firm conclusions about efficient pricing policies
without resolving esoteric debates about whether access is a separate service.34
4. Rate Averaging
A fourth erroneous concept regulators use is rate averaging. This concept
requires all consumers of a given service to pay the same price for that service,
even if the costs of providing it differ. Regulators use this concept to justify
charging rural and urban customers the same price for the access/local service
bundle although it is less expensive to provide that service to customers in
densely populated urban areas than to those in rural areas.
To our knowledge, no one has ever attempted to reconcile rate averaging
with value-of-service pricing, which results in customers paying different prices
for the same service though the costs of serving the customers are the same.
Such an attempt would be difficult at best. Both concepts entail a form of price
discrimination, differing only by which factor varies among customers. Value-
of-service pricing allows prices to differ though costs remain the same while
rate averaging allows costs to differ though prices remain the same. Such a
logical inconsistency is not uncommon in utility pricing; regulators seldom
question why some consumers pay different rates though costs are the same
while others pay the same rates though costs are different. Regulators attempt
to justify the former through value-of-service pricing and the latter through rate
averaging. The resulting prices diverge from marginal costs in either case;
hence, neither concept is compatible with efficient pricing principles.
It would also be difficult to reconcile either concept with the traditional
legislative mandate that regulatory commissions set just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory rates. While legislatures generally do not define "non-
discriminatory" in any detail, 3 it is patently clear that rates based upon either
value-of-service or rate averaging concepts are discriminatory in the economic
sense because they do not correspond to the costs of supplying service to
different customers.36 It is clear, however, that both practices are economically
inefficient and inconsistent with the principle of cost causation.
Thus, regulators superficially justify current telecommunications pricing
policies with concepts that are fundamentally fallacious. What appear to be
widely-accepted principles of utility rate making are in fact only thinly-veiled
justifications for inefficient, non-cost-based rate structures.
34. See William E. Taylor, Efficient Pricing of Telecommunications Services: The State of the Debate,
N REV. INDUS. ORGS. 21, 27 (1993).
35. Most legislation that creates regulatory commissions contains broad and often vague language. For
an economic explanation of such legislative ambiguities see Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 LAW, ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
36. For a definition of price discrimination, see FREDERICK M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 489 (3d ed. 1990).
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II. Existing Cross-Subsidies
Cross-subsidization among customers is a prevalent, if not ubiquitous,
characteristic of virtually all regulatory rate structures. 37 Substantial cross-
subsidies exist in telecommunications because the selective application of the
flawed pricing concepts discussed above yields rates that depart significantly
from the costs of providing the various services. The complexity of the price
structure and the many ways rates and costs diverge result in a number of
overlapping and criss-crossing subsidy flows. The following sections attempt
to unravel these flows.
A. The Complex Web of Subsidy Flows
Current rate-making practices create at least four major subsidy flows.
First, while per unit access charge rates have fallen since the AT&T divestiture,
the expanded volume of long distance calling has resulted in access charge
payments to local exchange companies of nearly $20 billion today.3" Second,
business customers subsidize residential customers as a result of value-of-
service pricing of local telephone service. 9 Third, the bundling of access and
local usage under a single flat rate with no usage fee forces light users of local
service to subsidize heavy users of that service. Fourth, rate averaging creates
a subsidy from urban to rural telephone customers.
The varied and often conflicting nature of these cross-subsidies frequently
makes it difficult to determine who actually subsidizes whom. Does a small
business owner in a rural area with relatively heavy usage of the local network
pay or receive a net subsidy? Does a rural residential customer with heavy
usage of long-distance service pay or receive a net subsidy? The answers are
not immediately apparent: one needs specific information on calling patterns
to determine the net effect of the various cross-subsidies on a given individual.
Without more specific information, one can only make definitive
statements about the overall direction of subsidy flows for two groups.
Residential customers who live in rural areas and are heavy users of the local
network with no long-distance usage definitely receive a subsidy. Similarly,
business customers in urban areas that place many long-distance calls and have
37. See generally Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL ]. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22 (197 1)
(noting frequency of cross-subsidies in regulation).
38. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON
CARRIERS 39 (1991/1992 ed. 1993). Because local exchange companies do incur some marginal costs
associated with the provision of carrier access, the subsidy flow, though large, is less than the full amount
of revenue transferred. We address arguments that this subsidy flow does not exist below. See infra text
accompanying notes 40-50.
39. Recent tests for the presence of this cross-subsidy confirm its existence. See Palmer, supra note
28, at 430.
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little use of the local service definitely pay a subsidy. Most customers do not
fit in either category; they both pay and receive subsidies. The net effect of this
complex system on their telephone bills is thus indeterminate a priori.
Despite this indeterminacy with respect to individual consumers, these
subsidy flows do systematically affect consumer groups as a whole. The bulk
of subsidies in this industry flow from business .to residential customers. Three
of the four subsidies identified above flow in this direction because business
customers are relatively heavy users of long-distance services, tend to be
located in urban areas, and pay relatively higher local rates. Consequently, local
residential service is the primary beneficiary of these cross-subsidies. •
In addition, the very complexity of this system with its resulting
uncertainty has some value to the regulator. If one robs Peter to pay Paul, he
is likely to be better off if Peter does not even know that he has been robbed
and if Paul is unaware of the source of his good fortune.
B. Does the Long-Distance to Local Cross-Subsidy Exist and Does It Matter?
Economists have long maintained that the historic practice of allocating
the fixed costs of the network to the long-distance market has resulted in a
significant cross-subsidization of the access/local service bundle, resulting in
local flat rates that fall far short of the costs of providing the combined
services. Several commentators now argue, however, that typical local telephone
rates are sufficient to cover the marginal cost of that service, including the
marginal cost of customer access. If the price of the local service/access bundle
equals or exceeds its marginal cost, then under Faulhaber's widely-accepted
definition of a cross-subsidy, it is not receiving a subsidy.' °
Proponents of this contention make two different arguments. The first
argument, which has surfaced in regulatory hearings in a number of states,
claims that no subsidization exists when long-distance services bear their
alleged fair share of the fixed costs of the local exchange because the marginal
costs of local service, including access, are below the rates charged. This
finding of no cross-subsidization, however, is the result of a fully distributed
cost shell game. Regulators make the cross-subsidies disappear by allocating
a substantial portion of fixed network costs away from the local service/access
bundle to long-distance service. Such allocation lowers the apparent magnitude
of the access/local service bundle's costs to the regulated price while pushing
up the perceived cost of long-distance service to its regulated price. As a result
40. Under the Faulhaber criteria, a service is receiving a subsidy only if the price of that service falls
below its marginal cost. Conversely, a service is paying a subsidy only if its price exceeds its stand-alone
costs (the costs of providing the service by itself, without combining its production with that of other
services). See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV.
966 (1975).
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of such gerrymandering of costs, the cross-subsidy seems to disappear. Such
demonstrations are simply the result of economically unwarranted cost
allocations. The entire exercise is a sham because the true marginal costs of
long-distance and local service contain no fixed costs. Relying on the
completely discredited concept of fully-distributed costs, we can dismiss this
line of reasoning because it lacks any logical foundation. 1
The second argument denying the existence of a long-distance to local
cross-subsidy is more complex. It addresses issues of efficient system design,
regulatory accounting practices, legal rules governing the right to recover past
investments, and the causal relationships that might exist between usage of
various services and the level of costs currently categorized as fixed. Most
recently, an article by David Gabel and Mark Kennet has renewed a debate on
this subject that has included Alfred Kahn, Lester Taylor, and William
Taylor.12 Gabel and Kennet argue that a two-part tariff, as recommended by
Kahn and others, will not necessarily improve overall economic efficiency
substantially. Their argument also implies that the long-distance to local service
cross-subsidy is illusory.
Gabel and Kennet's argument rests primarily upon two issues of fact.
4 3
First, they claim that technological change-specifically conversion of the tele-
communications network from analog to digital-makes customer access costs
increasingly usage sensitive. 4 They argue that, as a result, the current practice
of recovering these costs through usage-sensitive charges placed on long-
distance service, rather than through a fixed end-user access fee, is not
economically inefficient.
Gabel and Kennet also claim that prior estimates grossly overstate the
efficiency gains from a two-part tariff by using upwardly biased estimates of
the price elasticity of demand for long-distance service. 4' This claim is
supported only by their own reinterpretation of Lester Taylor's widely-cited
book on this subject. 46 They do not base their claim upon any new data or
empirical work of their own.
A review of Gabel and Kennet's article and the responses to it leads us
to conclude that their argument against adoption of a two-part tariff is woefully
41. Kahn, supra note I, at 142-43, disposes of these arguments quite convincingly. See also WENDERS,
supra note 9, at 173-77.
42. See David Gabel & Mark D. Kennet, Pricing of Telecommunications Services, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG.
1 (1993); Lester Taylor, Pricing of Telecommunications Services: Comment on Gabel and Kennet, 8 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 15 (1993); Taylor, supra note 34, at 21-38; Alfred E. Kahn, Pricing of Telecommunications
Services: A Comment, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 39 (1993); David Gabel & Mark D. Kennet, Pricing of Tele-
communications Services: A Reply to Comments, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 43 (1993).
43. The debate also involves certain theoretical issues that we do not explore here. In our opinion,
however, these issues are reasonably well-settled in favor of the two-part tariff.
44. Gabel & Kennet, supra note 42, at 2-3.
45. Id. at 8-11.
46. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 168-74.
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weak on both theoretical and empirical grounds. While it is plausible that
technological changes have made a greater portion of access costs usage
sensitive than economists had previously believed, it is implausible that all such
costs dre now variable. A significant share of the total costs of access remain
fixed, and recovering these fixed costs by increasing the price of usage above
its marginal cost is inherently inefficient. Furthermore, to the extent that use
of the local network is responsible for the portion of access costs that have
become variable, allocating these costs to long-distance service is also
inefficient. Thus, the mere observation that some percentage of access costs are
variable or that this percentage has increased is not a sufficient basis from
which to conclude that the current pricing structure is efficient or that
significant subsidization does not exist.
Two points regarding Gabel and Kennnet's claims about price elasticity
are worth noting. First, Lester Taylor's review of his own work and subsequent
empirical studies led him to conclude that "Gabel and Kennet are wrong in their
contention that the toll price elasticities used by Kahn and Shew and others in
assessing the welfare costs of present telecommunications pricing policies are
seriously overstated. 4 7 Given this conclusion, prior estimates of efficiency
losses do not appear to have suffered any upward bias due to this source.
Second, as noted above, these estimates exclude potentially more substantial
losses from the distortion of dynamic incentives to create and adopt innovative
uses of the long-distance network. Consequently, any bias in efficiency loss
estimates is probably downward. Thus, Gabel and Kennet's argument, that
perceived flaws in previous estimates of the efficiency losses warrant retaining
the existing inefficient pricing structure, is entirely unconvincing; the current
pricing policy is economically inefficient and does contain substantial elements
of cross-subsidization.
The behavior of both consumers and producers in the marketplace also
supports this conclusion. Telephone consumers certainly behave as though the
subsidy exists. The recent trend for heavy users of long-distance services to
bypass the local switched network provides indirect evidence that the price of
these services well exceeds cost. Bypass occurs when a customer obtains a
direct connection to the long-distance network. By circumventing the local
exchange company's switches, the long-distance carrier does not pay the access
charge that generates the subsidy flow. Customers bypass the local exchange
either by purchasing special access services from the long-distance carrier
(service bypass) or by constructing a private connection to the long-distance
network (facility bypass). Where bypass occurs, the price of long-distance
service routed through the local network must exceed the stand-alone costs of
that service, or it would not be profitable to provide the bypass facilities. If
47. Taylor, supra note 42, at 18.
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price exceeds stand-alone costs, there is no question that long-distance
customers are paying a subsidy.'"
The behavior of telecommunications suppliers also supports the conclusion
that the subsidy exists. Firms have an incentive to enter profitable markets; they
have no such incentive to enter unprofitable ones. Firms are thus likely to enter
markets where a subsidy keeps price above cost if they can avoid paying the
subsidy. Conversely, firms are unlikely to enter markets in which regulators
keep prices below cost, making up for the resulting loss with a subsidy.
The past twenty years have witnessed continual and increasing pressure
on regulators and courts to allow entry into the long-distance market. Only
recently have they felt pressure to permit entry into the local service market.4 9
We do not claim that the long-distance to local service subsidy is entirely, or
even primarily, responsible for this observed pattern of entry; however, such
a subsidy clearly can create incentives for entry into the long-distance
market.5" This pattern is therefore consistent with the presence of a long-
distance to local subsidy.
The question of whether or not this subsidy exists, however, is not as
important as the relevance of this question to the issue of efficient pricing. The
Faulhaber criteria for subsidy-free prices defines a wide range between marginal
cost and stand-alone cost, particularly if large common costs are present. Within
this range, prices may be efficient or inefficient even if no subsidy exists. Thus,
a subsidy is a sufficient condition for inefficient prices, but it is certainly not
a necessary one. Consequently, the whole debate regarding the existence and
magnitude of the cross-subsidy is only tangentially relevant to the issue of
efficient pricing.
To some extent, the argument over whether a subsidy exists is semantic.
The answer hinges upon one's definition of a subsidy and how one would
measure the costs of the services involved. Regardless of the position one
adopts, however, there is no economic justification for a system that places the
burden of fixed network costs on usage-sensitive prices. Such a system is
inefficient whether or not a subsidy results. Consequently, one need not become
mired in the subsidy debate to make definite statements about efficient pricing
policies. We will continue to use the cross-subsidization terminology throughout
the remainder of this Article because it is convenient to characterize the
48. See supra note 40.
49. See Paul W. MacAvoy and Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its
Impact on Telecommunications, I YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983), for a brief history of the regulatory and
judicial decisions that led to the current open-entry policies in the long-distance market. Metropolitan fiber
networks (alternative local transporters) have recently begun to seek entry into the local service market. This
entry may be the result of the subsidies from business to residential customers and from urban to rural
customers described above.
50. For an argument that the observed entry into long distance is due primarily to the regulatory
umbrella under which new firms may profitably operate, see id. at 3 1.
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overpricing of one service along with the underpricing of another as a cross-
subsidy whether or not these prices fall outside the range that the Faulhaber
criteria define. What is more, we are convinced that such cross-subsidization
exists, is substantial, and is an accurate description of the existing price
structure in this industry.
Ill. Properties of the Current System
From the standpoint of efficiency, arguably the economic formalization
of the public interest,51 the current pricing system has little, if anything, to
recommend it. A close examination, however, reveals that it also fails to serve
the other primary goals regulators ostensibly pursue, such as equity and
universal service.52 In fact, the current pricing system exhibits at least four
undesirable properties: (1) it is economically inefficient, (2) it is increasingly
impractical, (3) it is often inequitable, and (4) it does not promote universal
service.
A. The Current System is Inefficient
The current system encourages inefficient usage of both long-distance and
local service. It dissuades consumers from making long-distance calls with a
value that exceeds their costs by increasing the price of long-distance usage
above marginal costs. Similarly, it fosters excessive usage of the local network
by pricing local usage at zero. In short, the current system is inefficient
because it detaches prices from marginal costs.
The cost of maintaining this arcane system of overlapping and sometimes
offsetting subsidies is high. Economists have estimated that the long-distance
to local service subsidy alone costs society from $1.5 to $10 billion annually.54
These figures likely underestimate the total costs of this policy because they
51. See RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 11-22 (1979).
52. The Communications Act of 1934 states in part that a goal of telecommunications policy is "to
make available ... to all people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1937)). The lineage
of the universal service goal, however, traces to the early 1900s when Theodore Vail, then Chairman of
AT&T, announced a policy (if "One Policy, One System, Universal Service." See GERALD FAULHABER,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1987).
53. This is especially true where the excess demand for local usage occurs at peak periods. To meet
acceptable quality standards (such as blocking rates), local exchange companies must engineer their networks
to accommodate peak-period demand. Thus, the incremental cost, including both capital and usage, of peak-
period demand exceeds the marginal price (zero under flat-rate pricing) of additional local calling by a
considerable amount. For estimates of the magnitude (if these costs and how they vary by time of day, see
Griffen & Mayor, supra note 14, at 471. Moreover, while these costs appear small (roughly $.03 per minute
during peak periods), the losses caused by pricing marginal consumption of minutes at zero can easily
amount to millions of dollars. See Martins-Filho & Mayo, supra note 16, at 448-51.
54. See. e.g., Griffin, supra note 5, at 64.
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account only for static inefficiencies; that is, they are based on existing demand
and production technology. The artificial elevation of long-distance prices above
marginal costs, however, discourages the design and adoption of innovative new
technologies that employ the long-distance network. For example, this tax on
long-distance services discourages the demand for and development of
interactive distance-learning and long-distance medical imaging technologies.55
These static estimates do not include the opportunity costs arising from such
newborn or unborn innovations. Though there are obvious problems with
measuring these costs, the total costs of the dynamic distortion of the innovation
process may well exceed the losses from static inefficiencies. Consequently,
regulators should not view recommendations to adopt more efficient pricing
policies as mere calls to satisfy the esoteric whims of economic experts but
rather as serious appeals to serve the interests of their constituents.
B. The Current System Is Increasingly Impractical
It will prove difficult to sustain the current system of cross-subsidization
in the increasingly competitive environment of telecommunications. Competition
inexorably drives prices to marginal costs.56 Moreover, recent advances in
transmission and switching technology allow large users of the long-distance
network to avoid subsidies by bypassing the local network.57
Such bypass creates a chain reaction that ultimately will severely reduce
regulators' ability to enforce traditional cross-subsidies. The revenue base from
which regulators collect the subsidies will eventually erode as the largest users
of long-distance service bypass local networks. Loss of revenue from such
bypass will necessitate increased access charges on remaining long-distance
calls to maintain the former level of subsidization. In turn, this increase will
make additional bypass profitable, resulting in a further erosion of the subsidy
base.
55. While no quantification of the depressed demand for these innovative services is available, the
elevated prices clearly discourage demand. While recent authors have emphasized the importance of a state-
of-the art telecommunications infrastructure as a key to economic development, the development of
economically efficient pricing would seem to be an equally necessary ingredient for the promotion of such
innovative technological uses of the telecommunications network. For a more detailed discussion, see
WILLIAM F. Fox & JOHN W. MAYO, STATE-LEVEL TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE POST-
DIVESTITURE ERA: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1991).
56. In the U.S., long-distance prices will not fall to the true marginal cost of providing the service,
but rather to the marginal cost plus the tax on long-distance firms from the carrier access charges which
is the amount by which those charges exceed the marginal cost such firms impose on local exchange
companies.
57. One example are the "nodal" services long-distance carriers have developed that effectively
unbundle the purchase of access and long-distance transmission services, permitting very large
telecommunications users to shop around for access services. Other forms of alternative access include direct
fiber connections provided by one of the so-called "competitive access providers" or connection to a long-
distance carrier via a microwave linkage.
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The artificially high prices caused by the subsidy also increase the demand
for new, less expensive bypass technology. Such technology will develop with
time, increasing the amount of bypass that is profitable for any given level of
access charges. Thus, rising access charges and improving bypass technology
will both encourage more large long-distance consumers to abandon the local
network to escape the subsidy.
This dynamic process places the burden of the subsidy on a continually
diminishing group which uses long-distance services too infrequently to invest
in bypass technology. Large business customers, as the most intensive users
of the long-distance network, are most likely to bypass the local network. The
burden of the subsidy will thus gradually shift to small businesses and
residential customers. As the subsidy base erodes, regulators will eventually
have to reduce the overall size of the subsidy. The long-run equilibrium of this
dynamic process ultimately involves the elimination (or virtual elimination) of
the subsidy as local rates rise to cover the average costs of the access/local
usage bundle and the public switched network substantially disintegrates.
58
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recognized the
dynamic nature and seriousness of the bypass problem.
The seeds of bypass have already spread and bypass activities already
exist on a wide geographic basis. Because revenue losses from bypass
activities are recovered by charging higher rates to remaining
customers-residential subscribers and small business customers who
are unable to bypass-the Commission continues to regard bypass as
a serious problem at the current differentials between price and cost.
The concentration of traffic is such that bypass can be expected to
continue to grow so long as prices remain far above the costs of
providing service."
In addition, the staff of the Federal-State Joint Board wrote: "The reporting
carriers claim that bypass is still a threat. The total estimated revenue lost,
based on annualized 1988 rates, is $3.5 billion."6 Thus, the potential for
bypass poses a serious threat to the current pricing structure.
Bypass is a symptom of inefficient prices. The longer such prices remain,
the more large business customers will choose to escape paying subsidies by
circumventing the public network, and the higher the rates will become for
58. We abstract from the potential for technological changes to reduce the cost of providing the
access/local usage bundle. To the extent such changes occur, they will attenuate the upward pressure on
prices that stems from the reduced subsidies. The propensity of "taxed" users to circumvent payment will
continue, however.
59. FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, THIRD REPORT ON BYPASS OF THE
PUBLIC SWITCHED NETWORK (1987).
60. 4 FCC Rec. 5480 (1989).
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customers remaining on the network. Those who claim to champion the cause
of small residential customers by defending the current pricing system and
downplaying the threat of bypass actually harm those very customers in the
long run.
C. The Current System Can Be Inequitable
The current system is often inequitable. By inequitable, we simply mean
that subsidies will flow, on occasion and with unknown frequency, from
relatively poor individuals to relatively wealthy individuals. The current system
of cross-subsidization clearly exhibits this property because it has no means of
assuring that either the payers or payees of the subsidies are the desired or
deserving groups.6
The identity of these desired groups depends upon the policy goal that the
subsidy scheme intends to promote. If universal service is the goal, the group
that receives subsidization should include only those households that would
cancel their subscribership to the telecommunications network without the
subsidy. Certainly, subsidizing all subscribers entails a much larger subsidy than
this goal requires.62 If, on the other hand, the goal is simply to reduce the cost
of telephone service to families of limited means as part of a product-specific
transfer program, then only households that meet some specified income
criterion should receive the subsidy.63 Consequently, promotion of this goal
also fails to warrant subsidizing all local subscribers.
Not only does the untargeted nature of the current system of cross-
subsidization provide subsidies to a larger group than either of the above policy
goals justifies, but it also creates the possibility of perverse payments that
conflict with fundamental notions of equity. For example, such a policy may
transfer funds from relatively poor subscribers with a particularly heavy demand
for long-distance calls, such as older citizens whose families have moved away,
to relatively wealthy subscribers who confine the bulk of their residential calls
to the local exchange, perhaps because of access to a WATS line at work. This
sort of regressive transfer is inimical to the goals of income redistribution and
universal service.
61. The Lifeline and Link-up Programs established by the FCC and the Joint Board (a coalition of state
and federal regulators) are exceptions. Under these programs, low-income households that meet certain
eligibility conditions may receive explicit subsidization of either the initial installation charges or the ongoing
flat-rate monthly charge for basic telephone service. A more complete description of these plans appears
in Fox & MAYO, supra note 55, at 21-25.
62. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
63. Considerable overlap exists between these two groups due to a high income elasticity of the demand
for customer access. See Paul Cain & James M. MacDonald, Telephone Pricing Structures: The Effects on
Universal Service, 3 J. REG. ECON. 293 (1991).
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D. The Current System Does Not Promote Universal Service
For many years and in many different forums, opponents of a more
efficient pricing structure have argued that, although the current pricing system
is economically inefficient, it is nonetheless necessary to promote the goal of
universal service. Their underlying assumption is that cross-subsidization from
long distance to local service is necessary to foster maximum household
subscription to the public switched network. Moreover, supporters of this view
often uncritically attribute the tremendous growth in subscribership levels over
the past half-century to the existing pricing structure.' This widely-held view
has been repeated so often without serious examination, it has become the
telecommunications equivalent of the emperor's new clothes. This view is
simply not subject to question. 5
Close investigation of this position, however, reveals that it is both
theoretically and empirically flawed. Theoretically, utilizing either local or long-
distance services generally requires one to purchase access to the telecommuni-
cations network. The demand for access therefore depends upon the price of
using both services.66 Raising the price of one service (long-distance) to lower
the price of the other (local) may not have a large net effect on the overall
demand for customer access because these changes can offset one another.
Customers will simply place fewer long-distance calls or long-distance calls
of shorter duration (thereby reducing the demand for access) and more local
calls (thereby increasing the demand for access) in response to this alteration
of relative prices. The net effect on demand for access is therefore theoretically
indeterminate.
Considering the price elasticities of long-distance and local telephone
services underscores this indeterminacy. Specifically, raising the price of a
relatively price elastic service (long-distance) to lower the price of a relatively
price inelastic service (local usage) tends to reduce the overall demand for
access. Moreover, the demand for customer access itself is extremely price-
inelastic.6 7 Therefore, any policy that attempts to increase subscribership levels
64. Alternative explanations of the increase in subscribership include growth in incomes and the rising
importance of the ability to rapidly communicate with a wider audience.
65. Indeed, when the FCC introduced its access charge plan in 1983, which effectively began a phasing
out of the long-distance to local subsidy flows, Congressional backlash led to the proposed Universal
Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983. S. 1660, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). The purpose of this
legislation was to promote universal service by using "long distance rates to subsidize rural and residential
service" by "maintaining the status quo." The bill passed the House but died in the Senate. For a more
detailed discussion, see PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF PRICES AND POLITICS
306-17 (1987).
66. For a discussion of the underpinnings of telecommunications demand theory, see TAYLOR, supra
note 9, at 32-39.
67. See Cain & MacDonald, supra note 63, at 293; David L. Kaserman et al., Cross-Subsidization in
Telecommunications: Beyond the Universal Service Fairy Tale, 2 J. REG. ECON. 231, 232 (1990).
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by reducing the price of customer access is likely to have only limited success,
particularly if the program does not target specific beneficiaries.
Those who assume that the long-distance to local subsidy promotes
universal service typically presume that subscribership levels respond more to
local rates than to long-distance rates. This presumption is not necessarily true,
however. While it is true that the bundling of access and local usage under a
single flat rate means that lowering the price of local service will lower the
price of access as well, one must look further. Specifically, lowering the price
of the local access/usage bundle necessitates an increase in long-distance rates.
Because the demand for access is partially dependent upon these long-distance
rates, this rate increase reduces the demand for access. The net effect of
reduced local rates on access demand is thus indeterminate.
Bundling access and local usage together also necessarily increases the
price of access to customers who place relatively few calls. Such customers,
however, are the ones least likely to subscribe or most likely to cancel
subscribership. In this respect, the current pricing system actually works against
the goal of universal service. Regulators could promote this goal more
successfully by adopting efficient pricing policies, including unbundled access
and local usage and a much smaller subsidy targeted at specific groups, in place
of the current policy of broad untargeted subsidization with access and local
usage priced on a flat-rate basis.
Empirical studies support this conclusion. Bridger Mitchell found that
replacing the existing pricing structure with a more efficient one utilizing a two-
part tariff would significantly increase subscribership levels. 6 More recently,
Kaserman, Mayo, and Flynn concluded that increasing the long-distance to local
subsidy was unlikely to increase subscribership and that no significant
relationship exists between carrier access charges and subscribership in either
direction.69 Finally, a recent empirical study by Hausman, Tardiff, and
Belinfante of the demand for access to the telecommunications network found
an inverse relationship between the demand for access and long-distance rates.
Moreover, the study found the magnitude of this elasticity to exceed the price
elasticity associated with changes in the basic monthly telephone rate (the own-
price elasticity). Accordingly, the study concludes that a rebalancing of
telephone rates, including an increase in the local monthly flat rate and a
decrease in long-distance rates, could very well'lead to an increase in
subscribership." In sum, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that
69. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 532.
69. See Kaserman et al., supra note 67, at 234. Specifically, the study did not find higher levels of
carrier access charges, with the consequential high long-distance/low local price rate design, to cause higher
levels of telephone subscription. Moreover, the study also found no causal link between low subscribership
levels and regulators' propensity to raise subsidy flows.
70. See Jerry Hausman et al., The Effects of the Breakup of AT&T on Telephone Penetration in the
United States, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 178 (1993).
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the subsidy flow from long-distance to local service has no significant positive
effect on subscribership levels. The current inefficient pricing system does not,
in fact, support the policy goal of universal service. The emperor has no
clothes.
IV. Alternative Explanations for Regulators' Affection for Existing Cross-
Subsidies
Why have regulators continued to cling to this complex web of cross-
subsidies (to the extent mounting competition and bypass permit) despite the
desirable attributes of efficient pricing, the undesirable attributes of the existing
cross-subsidies, and the challenge to rationalize telecommunications pricing
Kahn issued a decade ago? What is it about this arcane system that regulators
find so attractive? To answer this question, we must delve into the positive
theory of regulatory behavior-the theory of why regulators do what we
actually observe them doing.
A prerequisite to influencing regulators' behavior is understanding the
motivation behind their actions. If regulators do not respond to the arguments
we present, it may very well be because we are presenting the wrong arguments
or presenting the right arguments wrongly. No matter how firmly one believes
an argument, it is unlikely to be convincing unless it is cast in terms that are
meaningful to its audience.7' Our purpose as economists is to offer the best
policy advice possible. But if we expect policymakers to be receptive to that
advice, we must provide information that is relevant to their concerns. To do
so, we must understand their underlying motivations.
Two principal and fundamentally different theories of regulatory behavior
exist.72 The public interest theory holds that regulators' goals are generally
consistent with the public interest. That is, they seek to achieve goals that the
relevant enabling legislation at least approximately specifies. Such legislation
typically directs them to make decisions that promote the public interest. Tele-
communications legislation often identifies the goal of universal service as well.
The. public interest theory thus predicts that regulators will adopt pricing
policies that enhance overall economic efficiency while simultaneously
promoting universal service.
71. It may also be true that regulators do not find the argument convincing. In the adversarial setting
in which most regulatory decisions are made, regulators typically hear conflicting arguments and may be
unable to identify the correct position.
72. Our taxonomy, though somewhat simplified, is consistent with the modem literature on regulation.
Actually, one can identify four or five alternative explanations of such behavior. See Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). On close inspection, however,
these various explanations are merely variants of the theories described herein.
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The economic theory of regulation, on the other hand, holds that regulators
have goals independent of any directives in the enabling legislation.73 Under
this theory, regulators' decisions often reflect self-serving political or economic
objectives. A principal-agent problem arises because pursuit of these objectives
may often conflict with pursuit of the public interest. Specifically, while the
regulatory body should ideally serve as the agent of the legislature (which is
ideally the agent of the public constituency that elected them), sufficient latitude
exists for regulators to substitute personal goals for those the law specifies. 74
The economic theory of regulation generally assumes that regulators' true
objective is to maximize political support. 75 The theory thus predicts that
regulators will favor policies serving the interests of what they perceive to be
their primary political constituency.76
Which of these alternative theories is more consistent with the behavior
of regulators in this industry? If the public interest theory were the operative
model, regulators would immediately and enthusiastically embrace the sort of
policies Kahn recommended, such as efficient prices and subsides targeted at
specific groups. These policies tend to maximize economic efficiency, foster
equitable pricing, and promote universal service. The failure of regulators to
adopt such policies provides strong evidence that this in not the correct theory
to explain regulatory behavior, at least in the telecommunications industry.77
The existing cross-subsidies are not only inefficient, but they also create
a pattern of subsidization that does not consistently promote universal service
or equitable pricing. Flat-rate pricing, for example, reduces subscribership by
increasing the price of local service to light users, who are the most likely
candidates to leave the network. Similarly, the cross-subsidy from urban to rural
customers is also likely to reduce overall subscribership because urban
73. The seminal contribution to this literature is George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3 (1971). A flood of research in this vein has since occurred. Recent
assessments include Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalansee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Sam Peltzman, The
Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS I (Martin H. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989).
74. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals
Agency Theory of Regulation, or 'Let Them Be Bribed,' 33 J.L. & ECON. 65, 66 (1990).
75. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
76. Some states, such as Tennessee, choose public utility commissioners in direct elections so that their
primary political constituency is comprised of prospective voters. In other states, including California, the
governor appoints the commissioners with the approval of the state legislature. Particularly in this latter case,
the state legislature and the governor are likely to be key political constituencies of regulators. For empirical
evidence on the importance of legislative preferences in determining regulatory behavior, see Barry R.
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking
by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 780 (1983). For specific evidence that legislative
preferences affect state-level regulatory decisions in the telecommunications industry, see David L. Kaserman
et al., The Political Economy of Deregulation: The Case of Intrastate Long Distance, 5 J. REG. ECON. 49,
52(1993).
77. Our conclusion assumes that those who oppose efficient pricing have not so clouded the arguments
that regulators cannot ascertain which policy best serves the public interest.
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customers have better access to substitutes for direct telephone service such as
pay phones and close neighbors. Both subsidies raise the price for the group
with relatively elastic demand, causing overall subscribership to fall. The
existing system is thus irreconcilable with either the public interest or universal
service. We must conclude that regulators in this industry are not driven by
these objectives. As a result, we can expect regulators to largely ignore policy
advice focused on achieving economic efficiency and increased subscribership.
The economic theory of regulation, on the other hand, explains the facts
quite well. To see this, we need only examine which customer group is the
primary beneficiary of the existing system of cross-subsidies and whether that
group is also likely to be the source of substantial political support for
regulatory commissioners or the principals they represent. Local residential
customers are the primary recipients of the benefits of the current pricing
structure. The cross-subsidy from long-distance services keeps local rates low,
and the subsidy from business customers keeps residential rates even lower. The
other two cross-subsidies present under the current policy, from light users to
heavy users and from urban to rural customers, both serve to spread the benefits
of these low residential rates across specific subgroups within this general class
of customers.78
The political support that local residential customers provide appears strong
relative to other customer groups that pay the bulk of the subsidy (long-distance
and business customers). This relative strength stems from four sources. First,
local rates are more immediately observable than long-distance bills, which vary
from month to month depending upon usage (including distance, duration, and
time of day). Barring a rate change, local rates are constant from one month
to the next. Furthermore, local rate increases receive widespread publicity.
Thus, information concerning the treatment of this particular interest group by
the regulatory commission is readily available.
Second, residential customers vote while business customers do not.
Although business customers could become politically influential through such
activities as direct lobbying and funding election campaigns, most firms'
telephone bills constitute such a small portion of their overall costs that these
78. This spreading is also consistent with the economic theory of regulation. See Peltzman, supra note
75.
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activities are not usually worthwhile.79 As a result, business customers
generally do not participate intensively at regulatory hearings in this industry. 0
Third, given the historical structure of rates in telecommunications, many
people have come to view inexpensive local service as something akin to a
social right and may perceive local rate increases as an infringement on that
right. People often characterize local service as a necessity, while they see long
distance as more of a luxury. Fourth, regulators keep rural residential rates low
through rate averaging', thereby serving the interests of the politically influential
rural consumer.8'
Thus, among the interest groups that telecommunications pricing policy
affects, local residential customers appear to be in the best position to exert
pressure on policy makers. The most likely explanation of the observed
reluctance of regulators to adopt more efficient pricing policies is their concern
over the political repercussions of infringing, or even appearing to infringe,
upon this group's interests. The regulators' affection for existing cross-subsidies
stems from the belief that such subsidies engender substantial political support.
Regulators are therefore likely to remain unresponsive to appeals to adopt
more efficient pricing policies based upon economic efficiency unless pro-
ponents of these policies convince them that such policies will not lead to
unacceptably large local rate increases or that the required increases will not
create the sort of political backlash that regulators fear. Fortunately, the
evidence emerging from policy changes that have occurred to date appears to
support both of these arguments. Specifically, regulators in a growing number
of states have implemented two changes that represent the initial steps on the
road to more intelligent telephone pricing and that opponents have predicted
would lead to substantial local rate increases. First, many states have
significantly reduced carrier access charges, largely in response to the threat
of bypass.82 Second, a number of states now allow interexchange carriers to
compete with local exchange companies for intraLATA toll services. 3
79. George Stigler, supra note 73, points out that we should expect small, easily organizable groups
with individually large stakes in regulatory decisions to dominate politically and therefore be the primary
beneficiaries of such decisions. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that communications services are
typically a very small share of firm costs. See Fox & MAYO, supra note 55, at 40. Thus, while businesses
are far less numerous than consumers and, thus more easily organized, the relatively low per capita interests
of firms in telecommunications makes it difficult for them to form effective coalitions on telecommunications
pricing issues.
80. The contrast between the absence of business involvement in telecommunications regulatory
hearings and the heavy involvement in electric cases seems to support this line of reasoning.
81. Independent telephone companies tend to represent the interests of rural customers at regulatory
hearings. Also, residential consumers of local service tend to be heavily represented by Offices of Public
Utility Counsel and State Attorneys General.
82. For documentation of these changes, see Fox & MAYO, supra note 55, at 17.
83. While states have authorized competitive entry by interexchange companies (for example, Sprint,
MCI, AT&T), no state to date has implemented 1+ equal access to all carriers providing intraLATA toll
calls. Thus, for customers to make an intraLATA toll call by a carrier other than the local operating
company, it is necessary for the customers to dial 1-0- followed by the particular carrier's access.code, then
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Various groups that benefit from the existing structure of access charges
and intraLATA entry restrictions opposed both of these policy changes. To a
large degree, the ground for such opposition has been the prediction that
adopting these policies would necessitate large local rate increases.' Despite
these predictions, the feared rate increase and resulting political uproar have
failed to materialize. For example, in states that have adopted open intraLATA
entry policies, local rates have changed, on average, at virtually the same rate
as in those states that have continued to prohibit interexchange carriers from
entering intraLATA toll markets. 5 Similarly, substantial reductions in intra-
state carrier access charges have failed to exert the pressure on local rates that
many had predicted. 6 Thus, it appears that the opponents of change have
greatly exaggerated the consequences of implementing a more efficient
telephone pricing structure. The resulting fear of such negative political
consequences has to this point stalled regulators' progress on the road to
improved telecommunications pricing policy. Regulators can, in fact, proceed
down the road to more intelligent pricing without sacrificing their political
support or careers.
Conclusion
The case for more intelligent pricing of telephone services is compelling.
Such pricing substantially improves economic efficiency and increases
subscribership levels. Economists generally disapprove of the current pricing
structure in this industry with its complex system of untargeted and
economically unwarranted cross-subsidies. As a result, the economics profession
has expressed both surprise and disappointment at the lethargic pace at which
regulators have proceeded down the road to more intelligent pricing policies
that the literature so clearly identifies.
We have attempted to explain regulators' apparent disinterest in the
economic arguments that have appeared to date. The explanation requires an
understanding of regulators' affection for the system of cross-subsidies that
economists find so patently unattractive. We can achieve that understanding
through a straightforward application of the economic theory of regulation to
the pattern of subsidies involved in telecommunications pricing. This pattern
of subsidies effectively distributes its benefits across all major subgroups within
the number they wish to reach. For a more detailed discussion, see Kaserman et al., supra note 25, at 8.
84. This argument (or threat) has succeeded in forestalling these policy changes in a number of states.
85. See Kaserman et al., supra note 25, at 24-25.
86. when regulators reduce carrier access charges, toll rates tend to fall. Falling toll rates stimulate
an increased volume of toll calls, generating more access charge revenues. In addition, the demand for toll
calls has risen over time, increasing the access charges that local exchange companies collect, while these
companies' fixed costs have been relatively constant. Consequently, access charge reductions have not
necessitated substantial local rate increases.
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the politically dominant interest group of local residential customers. Regulators
believe they maximize their political support by maintaining the existing
structure of cross-subsidies.
An improved understanding of regulatory behavior allows a more effective
approach to address regulators' reluctance to abandon the historical pricing
structure in telecommunications. We do not need to convince regulators that
universal service can survive efficient pricing or that adopting the recommended
policies will improve economic efficiency. Rather, we need to convince them
that local rates will not increase substantially and that the political consequences
of those relatively small increases that efficient pricing requires will not be
severe. Instead of continuing to explain the virtues of efficient pricing and
admonishing regulators to "do the right thing," we need to go a step further to
explain that the regulator will not sacrifice his political career, and may actually
enhance it, by adopting efficient prices. If regulators are to heed our advice,
we need to tailor our arguments to address the concerns of regulators, not
economists. We have been preaching to the choir, and, in so doing, we have
turned our backs on the congregation.

